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1. Introduction 
In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democratic decision making cannot be 
reduced to voting alone, but that it requires reasoned and well-informed discussion by those 
involved in and/or subject to the decisions in question, under conditions of equality and respect. 
In short, democracy requires deliberation (e.g., Cohen 1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 
Dryzek 2000; Fishkin 2009; Mansbridge et al. 2010). In formal political theory, by contrast, 
the study of democracy has focused less on deliberation, and more on the aggregation of 
individual preferences or opinions into collective decisions – social choices – typically through 
voting (e.g., Arrow 1951/1963; Riker 1982; Austen-Smith and Banks 2000, 2005; Mueller 
2003). While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social 
choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results showing 
that collective decision making cannot generally satisfy certain plausible desiderata. Any 
democratic aggregation rule that we use in practice seems, at best, a compromise.  
Initially, the two literatures were largely disconnected from each other. Since the 1990s, 
however, there has been a growing dialogue between them (e.g., Miller 1992; Knight and 
Johnson 1994; van Mill 1996; Dryzek and List 2003; Landa and Meirowitz 2009). This chapter 
reviews the connections between the two. Deliberative democratic theory is relevant to social 
choice theory in that deliberation can complement aggregation and open up an escape route 
from some of its negative results. Social choice theory is relevant to deliberative democratic 
theory in that its formal models can shed light on some aspects of deliberation, such as the 
nature of deliberation-induced opinion change.  
Sections 2 and 3 introduce the notions of social choice and deliberation. Section 4 discusses 
several hypotheses on the effects of deliberation on preferences and assesses their implications 
for social choice. Section 5 reviews some social-choice-theoretic models of deliberation and 
considers the mechanisms of deliberation-induced opinion change. Section 6 addresses 
deliberation from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory, the branch of social choice 
theory that focuses on the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences.  
2. The problem of social choice  
Collective decision making is a key feature of social organization, in bodies such as the 
electorate, legislatures, committees, courts, juries, expert panels, companies, and other 
organizations. In social choice theory, we model collective decision making as the aggregation 
of individual inputs, such as votes or preferences, into collective outputs, such as collective 
decisions or collective preferences. In fact, social choice theory can be defined as the study of 
aggregation. It must not be confused with rational choice theory, the study of individually 
rational behaviour and its collective consequences. The study of aggregation need not be 
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committed to the behavioural assumptions of rational choice theory; in particular, it need not 
be committed to any “homo economicus” or “self-interest” model of decision making. 
2.1 The basics 
The central concept of social choice theory is that of an aggregation rule. This is an input-
output scheme – a function – which takes as input the votes or preferences across the members 
of some group and delivers as output a collective decision or collective preference, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
For instance, a group of n individuals might have to make a choice between two options, x and 
y, such as two candidates, the acceptance or rejection of some proposal, or the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant. A combination of votes across the group is called a profile. It is a 
list of xs and ys whose ith entry stands for the vote of the ith individual. In a three-member group, 
the profile áx, x, yñ represents a situation in which the first two individuals vote for x and the 
third votes for y. An aggregation rule assigns to each profile a collective decision, which could 
be either x, or y, or (optionally) a tie. The best-known example is the majority rule. Here, for 
each profile, the output is the option (x or y) that is supported by the most votes; it is a tie if 
votes are equally split. Another example is a supermajority rule. Here, a supermajority (such 
as 2/3 or 3/4 or perhaps everyone) must vote for an option in order for that option to be chosen. 
A third, undemocratic example is a dictatorship of one individual, where the output always 
tracks the vote of a fixed individual, regardless of others’ votes.  
Social choice theory is concerned not just with specific examples of aggregation rules, but with 
the logical space of all possible aggregation rules. A typical research question is which rules, 
if any, have certain desirable properties (for a survey, see List 2013).    
2.2 Some arguments for the majority rule 
The majority rule has long been seen as the default democratic aggregation rule. Social choice 
theory offers at least three formal arguments for it, in decisions between two options (cf. List 
2013, sec. 2). The first is procedural. It invokes May’s theorem (1952): the majority rule is the 
only aggregation rule that satisfies four procedural desiderata in a two-option choice. These 
are: universal domain, which requires that any possible profile of individual votes be 
admissible as input; anonymity, which requires equal treatment of all voters; neutrality, which 
requires equal treatment of the two options; and positive responsiveness, which requires the 
individual inputs
(individual preferences / opinions / votes
on the given decision problem) 
voting procedure
(aggregation rule)
collective outputs
(collective preferences / opinions / choices
on the given decision problem)
Figure 1: The aggregative model
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output to be a positive function of the individual votes.2 If we consider these desiderata 
indispensable, then we have a strong reason to use the majority rule.  
The second argument is outcome-based. It appeals to the epistemic (“truth-tracking”) qualities 
of the majority rule and applies when there is an independent fact of the matter as to which 
option is “correct”. In a criminal trial, for instance, there is a fact as to whether the defendant 
is guilty or not. In such cases, Condorcet’s jury theorem shows that if all voters have an equal 
but independent chance better than random of voting for the correct option, then the majority 
decision is more likely to be correct than each individual’s vote, and the probability of a correct 
majority decision converges to 1 as the number of voters increases (e.g., Grofman, Owen and 
Feld 1983; List and Goodin 2001). In practice, the theorem’s assumptions – the independence 
of voters and their better-than-random reliability – are hard to achieve, but at least in favourable 
conditions the majority rule seems good at reaching correct decisions. 
The third argument is also outcome-based, but in a utilitarian rather than epistemic way. 
Suppose each voter gets a utility of 1 if the outcome of the collective decision, again among 
two options, matches his or her preference, and a utility of 0 otherwise. Then the majority rule 
selects the utility-maximizing option, a fact known as the Rae-Taylor theorem (e.g., Mueller 
2003). More generally, the majority rule maximizes the number of voters whose preferences 
are satisfied. However, this utilitarian argument for the majority rule only applies if all voters 
have an equal stake in the decision.3 
2.3 The paradoxes and impossibility results of social choice theory  
Condorcet, who had recognized the virtues of the majority rule in two-option choices, also saw 
what can go wrong when there are more options: an insight known as Condorcet’s paradox 
(e.g., Gehrlein 1983, 2006). Suppose there are three options, x, y, and z; a third of the voters 
prefer x to y to z; a second third prefer y to z to x; and the last third prefer z to x to y. Then there 
are majorities, of two thirds each, for x over y, for y over z, and for z over x: a preference cycle. 
Each option is beaten by another option in a majority contest. In such a situation, there is no 
Condorcet-winning option: an option that beats, or ties with, every other option in a pairwise 
majority vote. Furthermore, the majority preferences are intransitive: although x is majority-
preferred to y, and y is majority-preferred to z, x is not majority-preferred to z. If an individual 
had those preferences, he or she would be considered irrational: if I prefer apples to bananas, 
and bananas to coconuts, then I am rationally required to prefer apples to coconuts as well. 
Condorcet’s paradox challenges the notion of a majoritarian “will of people”. The “collective 
will”, if defined in a majoritarian way, may violate standard requirements of rationality, such 
as transitivity. 
Condorcet’s paradox might be considered an isolated artefact. However, a series of influential 
results in social choice theory, of which Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1951/1963) is the most 
important, suggests that Condorcet’s paradox is just the tip of the iceberg of a larger problem. 
To explain Arrow’s theorem, suppose that, as before, there are n individuals, and each submits 
a preference ordering over the options (x, y, z, etc.), ranking them from most to least preferred. 
Let P1, P2, …, Pn denote these n individual preference orderings.4 A preference aggregation 
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rule assigns to each such list, or profile, of preference orderings a resulting collective 
preference ordering, P, which ranks the options from collectively most to least preferred.  
Arrow suggested that an acceptable aggregation rule should satisfy at least five desiderata. 
Universal domain: any possible profile of individual preference orderings is admissible as 
input. Collective rationality: the output is a well-defined preference ordering; in particular, 
there are no cycles as in Condorcet’s paradox. The Pareto principle: if everyone prefers x to y, 
then x is collectively preferred to y. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: the collective 
preference between any pair of options, x and y, depends only on the individual preferences 
between x and y, not on the individual preferences with respect to other options. Non-
dictatorship: there is no fixed individual who always determines the collective preference. 
Arrow’s theorem shows that the five desiderata are mutually inconsistent when there are more 
than two options: there exists no preference aggregation rule satisfying all of them. In the 
special case of two options, the majority rule satisfies all five. 
In practice, then, any aggregation rule must violate at least one desideratum, and this comes at 
a cost. If an aggregation rule violates universal domain, it does not cope with all possible 
profiles of preferences and is therefore not robust to pluralism. If it violates collective 
rationality, it fails to rank the options in a complete order or generates preference cycles, as in 
Condorcet’s paradox. If it violates the Pareto principle, it sometimes overrules unanimous 
preferences. If it violates independence of irrelevant alternatives, it has at least two potential 
defects. The first is a lack of transparency: the collective preference between two options, x 
and y, may change from one profile to another as a result of changes in preferences with respect 
to other options, even when everyone’s preferences between x and y remain unchanged. The 
second defect is vulnerability to strategic voting: a failure of “strategy-proofness”. Individuals 
may have opportunities to manipulate the outcome by voting strategically – a point established 
more precisely by another classic result: the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973; 
Satterthwaite 1975). Finally, if the aggregation rule violates non-dictatorship, it is outright 
undemocratic. 
Riker (1982) interpreted the social-choice-theoretic impossibility results as challenging the 
coherence of any form of democracy that relies on the notion of the “will of the people”, where 
this is an aggregate of “individual wills” (cf. Coleman and Ferejohn 1986; Cohen 1986; Knight 
and Johnson 1994; McGann 2006).5 Over the years, Riker’s negative interpretation has become 
less widely accepted, and social choice theorists, including prominently Sen (e.g., 1998), have 
devoted much energy to finding escape routes from Arrow’s theorem and related results. They 
have done so, on the one hand, by showing that there are reasons for relaxing some of Arrow’s 
desiderata in certain contexts, and on the other hand, by reformulating the problem of social 
choice, permitting for instance inputs that go beyond rankings of the options. Richer inputs 
may take the form of cardinal utility assignments, ratings, or judgments (cf. List 2013, sec. 4-
5; Balinski and Laraki 2011).  
Still, one lesson is hard to contest: there does not exist a single, universally best aggregation 
rule. Choosing an aggregation rule requires trade-offs between different desiderata, and 
different solutions to those trade-offs are appropriate in different contexts. 
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3. Democratic deliberation 
In contrast to aggregation, which is the merging of different people’s opinions into a single 
collective output, deliberation, as noted, is the reasoned and well-informed discussion of these 
opinions by the people involved, under conditions of equality and respect. There are several 
definitions of deliberation in the literature, which differ, among other things, in whether they 
define deliberation as a procedure or as a behaviour, and in how idealized they are.   
3.1 The procedure-behaviour distinction 
Just as we distinguish between voting procedures and voting behaviour, so we can distinguish 
between deliberative procedures and deliberative behaviour (Landa and Meirowitz 2009).6 
Deliberative procedures are settings in which deliberation can take place. If we give voters an 
opportunity to talk before voting, this is an instance of a deliberative procedure: “first talk, then 
vote” (e.g., Goodin 2008, ch. 6). Deliberative behaviours are the ways in which people actually 
deliberate: how they treat each other when they communicate, what they say, whether they are 
truthful or manipulative, whether they change their opinions, and so on.  
We can now define deliberation either in terms of the procedural setup, for instance as a 
communication procedure with equal and fair participation, or in terms of the behaviour that 
takes place, for instance as reasoned, well-informed, and respectful speech. Clearly, there is a 
connection between procedures and behaviours. Different procedures may lead to different 
behaviours. The way people deliberate may be affected, for example, by the presence of a 
moderator or by constraints on the timing and duration of each participant’s speech. Once we 
have criteria for the behaviours that count as “deliberative”, we can ask which procedures 
facilitate or promote those behaviours (cf. Landa and Meirowitz 2009). 
3.2 The idealism-realism distinction 
Some definitions of deliberation are more idealized (so that “deliberation” becomes harder to 
achieve in practice, while perhaps serving as an aspirational ideal), others more realistic (so 
that “deliberation” is a more common phenomenon). A definition that requires deliberation to 
generate an “ideal speech situation”, a setting of power-free discourse (a notion associated with 
Habermas), would fall on the idealized side of the spectrum (cf. Bohman and Rehg 2014), as 
would a definition of deliberation as communication that is fully informed, rational, truthful, 
oriented towards the common good, egalitarian and respectful, and based on public reasons. 
By contrast, a definition of deliberation simply as pre-vote communication, which need not 
exclude negotiation and self-interest, would be more realistic (cf. Mansbridge et al. 2010).7  
3.3 A working definition 
I will here adopt a procedural definition that is relatively realistic. I will define deliberation as 
a communicative procedure, typically in the run-up to a collective decision, which is designed 
to promote substantive, balanced, and civil discussion. “Substantive” means that it focuses on 
the options and the reasons for preferring or dispreferring them (this may include narratives 
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can be realistic definitions under which deliberation is highly desirable. Furthermore, the value and desirability 
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and the sharing of experiences); “balanced” means that it involves different perspectives, 
arguments, and views; and “civil” means that it is respectful (Fishkin and Luskin 2005; List, 
Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean 2013; Fishkin 2009).  
We can then explore how deliberation, so defined, might relate to aggregation. According to a 
“pure deliberative model”, deliberation replaces aggregation, and leads directly to a collective 
decision: a consensus or a compromise. This stands in contrast to a “mixed model”, according 
to which deliberation complements aggregation. Here, people first deliberate and then vote. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate those two models. The comparative baseline is the “pure aggregative 
model”, as shown in the earlier Figure 1. 
  
4. The effects of deliberation on individual preferences 
To assess the different models of decision making, it is helpful to compare three hypotheses 
about the effects of deliberation on preferences. I begin with a very optimistic hypothesis. 
4.1 The consensus hypothesis: Deliberation tends to generate a consensus 
If true, this would make the pure deliberative model tenable. Elster (1986, p. 112) summarizes 
the idea as follows: “rather than aggregating or filtering preferences, the political system should 
be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation ... [T]here would 
not be any need for an aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to 
produce unanimous preferences.”  
As most theorists recognize, however, we cannot rely on deliberation to generate a consensus. 
Very few real-world organizations manage to make pure consensus decisions, the Quakers 
being one often-cited example. Indeed, if we were to define deliberation as a form of consensus-
generating discussion, real-world instances of deliberation would be rare. Arguably, a minimal 
constraint on a realistic definition of deliberation is that it is a contingent matter whether a 
consensus emerges, not a definitional matter. Since the consensus hypothesis is not generally 
true under the definition of deliberation I am using, the pure deliberative model is not realistic.   
4.2 The no-helpful-change hypothesis: Deliberation does not helpfully reduce preference 
diversity 
On a strong version of this hypothesis, people’s opinions on many issues are too entrenched to 
be open to change in a time-limited deliberative process. Mackie (2006, p. 279) describes this 
as follows: “[P]ublic deliberation on a pending item seldom seems to change anyone’s mind… 
individual inputs
(individual preferences / opinions
on the given decision problem) 
deliberative procedure
collective outputs
(collective preferences / opinions / choices
on the given decision problem)
Figure 2: The pure deliberative model
pre-deliberation preferences / opinions
(on the given decision problem)
deliberative procedure
post-deliberation preferences / opinions
(which may be ‘filtered’ / ’transformed’)
voting procedure
(aggregation rule)
collective outputs
(collective preferences / opinions / choices
on the given decision problem)
Figure 3: The mixed model
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[D]ue to the network [structure of individual opinions], the effects of deliberative persuasion 
are typically latent, indirect, delayed, or disguised.”  
While the consensus hypothesis was too optimistic, the “no-change” hypothesis is too 
pessimistic. Experience suggests that deliberation sometimes changes people’s minds, and 
there is some social-scientific evidence that deliberation promotes reflection and learning, and 
generates more considered preferences (e.g., Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Barabas 2004; 
Farrar et al. 2010). In particular, the experimental design of Deliberative Polling, developed by 
Fishkin and colleagues, allows us to compare people’s opinions before and after deliberation. 
In a Deliberative Poll, between 130 to 350 randomly chosen members of the public are first 
interviewed on some policy issue; they then receive carefully balanced briefing materials and 
participate in a weekend of group deliberation; finally, they are interviewed again, using the 
same questions as before.8 The results suggest that deliberation tends to change opinions and 
to make participants better informed, but also that it does not normally generate unanimity.  
Even if deliberation changes opinions, this may not be enough to solve the problem of social 
choice. Post-deliberation preferences still need to be aggregated. As van Mill (1996, 2006) 
points out, if the deliberative procedure is relatively open, it might lead to post-deliberation 
preferences to which the social-choice-theoretic paradoxes and impossibility results continue 
to apply. The challenge, he says, is “to discover specific rules [of deliberation] that create 
stability [in the social-choice-theoretic sense] without, at the same time, completely 
undermining the freedom and equality so necessary for the legitimacy of outcomes. Too much 
participation and we do not get stability; too little and we end up with an overly constrained 
system” (1996, p. 749). If this challenge remains unresolved, we cannot conclude that 
deliberation facilitates social choice.  
Interestingly, deliberation might interact with the mechanism underlying Condorcet’s jury 
theorem. While not generating a consensus, deliberation might increase the reliability of 
individual opinions in cases where there is an independent fact as to which option is “correct”. 
At the same time, it might generate interdependencies between different individuals’ opinions. 
In short, it might helpfully affect voter reliability, but adversely affect voter independence. For 
a discussion of this tradeoff, see Dietrich and Spiekermann (2013). Let me now turn to a third 
hypothesis about deliberation’s effects. 
4.3 The meta-consensus hypothesis: Deliberation tends to generate a meta-consensus, which 
is associated with “single-peaked” preferences  
To explain this, first note that, although a full consensus – a situation of unanimous preferences 
– is sufficient for avoiding Condorcet’s paradox and Arrow’s theorem,9 it is not necessary. A 
certain amount of structure in the occurring profiles of individual preferences is sufficient. 
Black (1948) identified a relevant structure condition, called “single-peakedness”. 
A profile of preference orderings across a group of individuals is single-peaked if the options 
can be aligned from left to right such that each individual has an ideal point somewhere on this 
left-right axis, with decreasing preference for options as they get more distant, in either 
direction, from the ideal (cf. Arrow 1951/1963, ch. 7). For instance, a voter might most prefer 
a “leftist” option and prefer other options less as they are further to the right. Another voter 
might most prefer a “centrist” option and disprefer more extreme options. The left-right axis 
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relative to which preferences have this structure is called a structuring dimension. “Left” and 
“right” are geometrical notions here; they could have various meanings: “progressive” and 
“conservative”, “urban” and “rural”, “secular” and “religious”, and so on. Figure 4 shows a 
single-peaked profile of three individual preference orderings over five options, x, y, z, v, w 
(left-right aligned in this order), and Figure 5 shows a non-single-peaked preference ordering.10   
 
 
Single-peakedness is a sufficient condition for transitive majority preferences and for the 
existence of a Condorcet-winning option, namely the option that is most preferred by the 
median individual with respect to the relevant structuring dimension. This fact is called the 
median-voter theorem.11  
Furthermore, suppose we replace Arrow’s universal-domain desideratum with the requirement 
that the aggregation rule admit as input only all single-peaked preference profiles. The majority 
rule then satisfies all of Arrow’s other desiderata. A similar point can be made with regard to 
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on strategy-proof aggregation. On the domain of single-
peaked preference profiles, the majority rule (along with other “median voting rules”) is not 
vulnerable to strategic voting (Moulin 1980). Moreover, as discussed later, even if a high-
enough proportion of the individuals have single-peaked preferences, cyclical majority 
preferences are unlikely (Niemi 1969). 
So, if deliberation generates single-peaked preferences, then it will open up an escape route 
from the paradoxes and impossibility results of social choice theory. Riker, who had 
emphasized the social-choice-theoretic challenge for democracy, accepted this conditional 
claim, writing: “[i]f, by reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and political 
socialization, voters have a common view of the political dimension (as evidenced by single-
peakedness), then a transitive outcome is guaranteed” (1982, p. 128). But he suggested that the 
effect would occur only for “issues of minor importance”.  
Several scholars, however, have defended the “if” part of the conditional and argued that 
deliberation, at least under favourable conditions, can be expected to produce single-peaked 
preferences (Miller 1992; Dryzek and List 2003; cf. Knight and Johnson 1994).12 Why? A 
possible mechanism involves a deliberation-induced “meta-consensus”. Although deliberation 
is unlikely to generate unanimity – a “substantive consensus” – it may generate an agreement 
on a common dimension in terms of which to conceptualize the issue and along which 
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peakedness, under the present Black-Arrow definition, should not be confused with spatial single-peakedness, 
common in spatial voting theory, which presupposes that options are defined as points in some exogenously given 
issue space. Here, I make no such assumption. The positioning of options could be endogenous. Spatial single-
peakedness is sufficient for the avoidance of majority cycles only when the issue space is one-dimensional. 
12 For discussion, see also Aldred (2004) and Dryzek and List (2004). 
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preferences will become single-peaked: a “meta-consensus”. (See List 2002 on “substantive” 
versus “meta-level” agreement; cf. Dryzek and List 2003.13) For example, a group of 
deliberators may fail to agree on how to rank the options, but come to agree that their 
disagreement concerns a trade-off between the economy and the environment. The following 
three-part hypothesis summarizes the proposed mechanism (quoting List 2007):14 
(1)  Group deliberation leads people to identify a common (semantic) issue 
dimension in terms of which to conceptualize the decision problem at stake [such 
as socio-economic left versus right, secular versus religious, or urban versus rural].  
(2)  For a given such issue dimension, group deliberation leads people to agree on 
how the decision options are aligned from left to right with respect to that issue 
dimension; so people determine which (geometric) structuring dimension best 
represents the given (semantic) issue dimension.  
(3)  Once a (semantic) issue dimension and a corresponding (geometric) structuring 
dimension have been identified as relevant, group deliberation leads each 
individual to determine a most preferred position (his or her “peak”) on that 
dimension, with decreasing preference as options get increasingly distant from the 
most preferred position. 
If this mechanism works, it supports the mixed decision model of Figure 3: deliberation 
followed by aggregation.15 (For a critical discussion, see Ottonelli and Porello 2013. For a 
formalization of the mechanism in dynamic logic, see Goldbach 2015. On the relationship 
between a common semantic issue dimension and single-peakedness, see Porello 2016.)  
4.4 Empirical evidence and assessment 
Data from Deliberative Polls support the hypothesis just discussed (List, Luskin, Fishkin, and 
McLean 2013; Farrar et al. 2010). Deliberative Polls enable us to compare the participants’ 
preferences before and after deliberation. The relevant study covered nine polls, discussing 
thirteen issues, from energy provision in Texas to the future of the monarchy in Australia. The 
finding was that post-deliberation preferences tended to be closer to single-peaked than pre-
deliberation preferences. Specifically, the study measured proximity to single-peakedness (as 
defined by Niemi 1969): the proportion of individuals whose preferences are single-peaked 
relative to a common structuring dimension.  
The increases in proximity to single-peakedness were greater for low-salience issues (such as 
energy provision), on which people’s opinions were presumably less entrenched, than for high-
salience issues (such as the monarchy), on which people were presumably more opinionated. 
The increases were also greater for issues that more readily lend themselves to a 
unidimensional conceptualization. And the increases were greater for the subsamples of 
participants who emerged from the deliberation better informed, as judged from their answers 
to some factual questions.  
																																																						
13 For further notions of meta-consensus not associated with social-choice-theoretic structure conditions, see 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006). For a technical analysis, see Gehrlein, Lepelley, and Moyouwou (2015). 
14 Variants also appeared in List (2002) and Dryzek and List (2004). 
15 A shallower mechanism generating single-peakedness might involve a tendency for deliberators to mimic the 
preferences of opinion leaders with single-peaked preferences (List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean 2013). 
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It remains an open question whether deliberation would also generate single-peaked 
preferences on issues beyond those covered in the study, and how scalable the mechanism is, 
i.e., whether the effect could occur in larger groups or in the electorate as a whole, for instance 
as a result of a nation-wide “deliberation day”, as proposed by Ackerman and Fishkin (2002).  
One might also wonder whether the phenomenon of deliberation-induced single-peakedness is 
consistent with another frequently documented effect of deliberation: group polarization. 
Deliberating groups sometimes take more extreme positions after deliberation than before 
(Sunstein 2002). A mildly conservative group might become strongly conservative; a mildly 
progressive group might become strongly progressive. However, group polarization has been 
observed especially in homogenous groups, as distinct from the more heterogeneous groups of 
the Deliberative Polls and other groups that are reasonably representative of the general public. 
Heterogeneity reduces the risk of creating an echo chamber in which prior opinions are simply 
reinforced.16 That said, increases in proximity to single-peakedness are consistent with 
increases in polarization. Preferences can be both single-peaked and polarized.  
Another common objection to the hypothesis of deliberation-induced single-peakedness is that 
single-peakedness is a very demanding condition, and many issues do not lend themselves to 
a unidimensional conceptualization (e.g., Aldred 2004). However, other less demanding 
structure conditions on preferences are still sufficient for avoiding majority cycles, but easier 
to attain than single-peakedness. An example is “triplewise value restriction” (Sen 1966), 
which requires that, among every triple of options, one option is never ranked top, or never 
ranked middle, or never ranked bottom. Unidimensionality is not required for this. A second 
example is “aggregate ideological consistency” (Feld and Grofman 1988), which secures a 
majority preference ordering that is single-peaked relative to a single dimension while not 
requiring individual preference orderings to be single-peaked relative to the same dimension.  
As Sen (1966, p. 498) notes, “[a] comparatively limited measure of agreement seems to be 
sufficient to guarantee consistent majority decisions”. The deliberative-democracy literature 
has perhaps focused more on single-peakedness than on other structure conditions because it 
is easier to hypothesize a mechanism by which deliberation might generate single-peakedness 
(given its interpretability in terms of a common issue dimension) than to hypothesize a similar 
mechanism for the alternative conditions.  
4.5 Deliberation and the probability of majority cycles 
Finally, it is worth noting that, in combinatorial terms, the avoidance of cycles via the 
structuration of preferences is simpler than one might think. Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that individual preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution over all possible preference 
orderings. For example, when there are three options, there are six logically possible strict 
orderings, and each individual would then have a probability of 1/6 of holding each of them. 
The resulting probability distribution over preference profiles is called an impartial culture 
(e.g., Gehrlein 1983). It is known that this distribution maximizes the probability of majority 
cycles (Tsetlin, Regenwetter, and Grofman 2003). Calculations further suggest that, given an 
impartial culture, the probability of a majority cycle increases, as the number of options 
																																																						
16 Even in homogenous groups, polarization seems not to occur under sufficiently favourable deliberative 
conditions (Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä 2015). 
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increases and also as the number of voters increases (Gehrlein 1983). But one striking point is 
often overlooked.  
Not only do slight increases in proximity to single-peakedness, compared to the baseline of an 
impartial culture, reduce the probability of cycles (Niemi 1969; cf. Gehrlein, Lepelley, and 
Moyouwou 2015). But it can also be shown that the slightest systematic deviations from the 
impartial-culture distribution can have the same effect in a large electorate (List and Goodin 
2001, Appendix 3). In the three-option example, if each individual’s probability of holding 
each of the six possible preference orderings is not uniformly 1/6, but a little above 1/6 for some 
orderings and a little below 1/6 for suitable others, then the probability of a majority cycle 
converges to zero, as the number of voters increases. Thus the prediction of a sizeable 
probability of cycles under an impartial culture is a “knife-edge” result. 
To be sure, one can also construct deviations from an impartial-culture distribution that do not 
have this cycle-avoiding effect, but these are arguably more contrived than the deviations that 
reduce the probability of cycles. Indeed, several recent studies suggest that cycles are 
empirically rare, and that they should be theoretically expected to be rare, even outside 
deliberative settings (Mackie 2003; Regenwetter et al. 2006; Gehrlein 2006; Gehrlein and 
Lepelley 2011). Cycles are probable only when preference diversity is very symmetrical, as it 
is under an impartial-culture distribution, and suitable structures in the distribution of 
preferences that break this symmetry can reduce their probability. It is not implausible that 
deliberation could have such a structuration effect.  
5. Formal models of deliberation 
I have discussed the idea that deliberation can change individual opinions. I will now review 
several social-choice-theoretically inspired models of deliberation and say more about the 
mechanisms of deliberation-induced opinion change.  
5.1 A model of deliberation as preference transformation 
I begin with a simple model adapted from List (2011b). In this model, people enter the 
deliberative procedure with their pre-deliberation preferences and emerge from it with their 
post-deliberation preferences. As before, each individual’s preferences take the form of a 
ranking of the options from most to least preferred. The model assumes functionality: the 
deliberative procedure is represented by a function which maps each profile of pre-deliberation 
preference orderings áP1, P2, …, Pnñ across an n-member group to a resulting profile of post-
deliberation preference orderings áP*1, P*2, …, P*nñ, as shown in Figure 6. Call such a function 
a preference transformation function. It captures the relationship between pre-deliberation 
inputs and post-deliberation outputs from a bird’s eye perspective. 
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Here are some baseline desiderata that we might expect a preference transformation function 
to satisfy. Universal domain: any possible profile of individual preference orderings is 
admissible as input. Post-deliberation rationality: the output is a profile of well-defined 
preference orderings. Consensus preservation: in cases of pre-deliberation unanimity (where 
P1 = P2 = … = Pn), the unanimous agreement is preserved after deliberation. Minimal 
relevance: the individuals do not always ignore their pre-deliberation preferences in forming 
their post-deliberation preferences.17 Finally, pairwise independence: the post-deliberation 
preferences for any pair of options depend only on the pre-deliberation preferences for that 
pair; this ensures “strategy-proofness” of the deliberative process.  
A theorem proved in List (2011b) implies that, when there are more than two options, there is 
only one preference transformation function that satisfies all five desiderata, namely the trivial 
function under which there is no preference change at all (i.e., P*1 = P1, P*2 = P2, P*3 = P3, and 
so on). In the special case of only two options, deference to the majority preference is a non-
trivial transformation function that satisfies all five desiderata.  
As with other impossibility results, we should not over-interpret this result, but view it as telling 
us something about the desiderata that a deliberative procedure could or could not satisfy. For 
instance, pairwise independence is arguably too restrictive. Plausibly, deliberation is holistic: 
an individual’s post-deliberation preference between two options may depend on what he or 
she learns about others’ pre-deliberation preferences for third options. The downside of this 
holism is that deliberation may be vulnerable to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. 
Whether this is a serious problem will depend on a number of empirical facts, such as the 
participants’ motivations and dispositions. Likewise, there may be situations in which a 
deliberative procedure need not satisfy some of the other desiderata. We may be prepared to 
relax universal domain in cases in which we can assume a certain level of pre-deliberation 
agreement. And we may be prepared to relax post-deliberation rationality if a complete ranking 
of the options by the deliberators is not required. 
A different response is to challenge the assumption of functionality. Are post-deliberation 
preferences really fully determined by pre-deliberation preferences, as functionality requires? 
Or is deliberation an indeterministic or stochastic process? One way to relax functionality 
without denying that the output of the deliberation is determined by its input is to argue that 
post-deliberation preferences depend on a richer input, beyond pre-deliberation preferences. 
The enriched input might include the participants’ information and/or their reasons for 
preferring or dispreferring the options. However, enriching the input of deliberation does not 
automatically allow us to bypass the present impossibility theorem. A variant also holds when 
the inputs and outputs take the form of judgments rather than preferences (List 2011b).18    
5.2 A model of deliberation and aggregation 
While the model just discussed represents the transformation of preferences without modelling 
their subsequent aggregation, a combined model of preference transformation and aggregation 
has been developed by Perote-Peña and Piggins (2015). In this model, a deliberation stage at 
which preferences are transformed is followed by a voting stage at which preferences are 
																																																						
17 Formally, two preference profiles are called i-variants if they coincide for all individuals except i. Minimal 
relevance requires that, for each individual i, there be at least one admissible pair of i-variant pre-deliberation 
profiles for which individual i’s post-deliberation preference orderings differ.  
18 On the transformation of judgments in deliberation, see also Slavkovik and Jamroga (2016) and, in relation to 
probabilistic judgments, Lehrer and Wagner (1981). 
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aggregated, as in Figure 3 above. Unlike most social choice theorists, who adopt a non-
cognitivist (desire or taste) interpretation of preferences, Perote-Peña and Piggins assume that 
each individual’s preference ordering represents his or her beliefs as to how good the options 
are from the perspective of the group, where there exists a true objective betterness ordering. 
They further assume, in a deliberative spirit, that individuals reveal their preferences sincerely.  
The model allows us to investigate the conditions under which the combination of deliberation 
and voting is truth-revealing, in that it leads the group to make the “correct” social choice 
(according to the true betterness ranking of the options), irrespective of the group’s initial 
preference profile.19 Perote-Peña and Piggins assume that, in deliberation, any individual who 
holds the correct preference over a given pair of options will not abandon this preference, but 
may have a chance of persuading others to adopt that preference. Others, in turn, will be open 
to persuasion if they perceive the given individual’s preferences as sufficiently close to their 
own preferences, but not if they perceive them as too distant. This reflects the idea that people 
are more likely to be persuaded by those whose views are similar to their own views.  
It then follows that the key determinant of truth revelation of the deliberation-and-aggregation 
process is the persuasion cost. This is defined as a measure of how similar any two individuals’ 
preference orderings must be for one of the individuals to have a chance of persuading the 
other. If the persuasion cost is high, then truth revelation – indeed, any preference change – is 
not generally possible to achieve. In this case, the individuals are unwilling to be persuaded by 
anyone except those whose preferences are maximally similar to their own preferences. If the 
persuasion cost is not too high, by contrast, then truth revelation is feasible. Here, the 
individuals are, in effect, more willing to listen to others. Truth revelation, however, requires 
a carefully designed deliberation procedure, specifying who talks to whom and in which order, 
and a suitably chosen aggregation rule.  
5.3 A game-theoretic model of deliberation as information sharing 
A third model of deliberation can be motivated by reference to a game-theoretic observation 
about jury decisions (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998). Suppose a 12-member jury (initially 
in conditions without deliberation) has to reach a verdict in a criminal trial and uses the 
unanimity rule, where a “guilty” verdict is reached if and only if all jurors vote for “guilty”. 
Suppose further that each juror has received some independent and private information, a 
binary signal of the form “guilty” or “not guilty”, which is fallible but correlated with the truth; 
say, it has a 70% chance of being correct.20 Under these assumptions, one would think it is very 
unlikely that an innocent person will be convicted. If all jurors vote truthfully – i.e., in line with 
their private information – there is only a chance of (30%)12 that a unanimous verdict for 
“guilty” will be incorrect: less than one in a million. 
However, suppose that each juror is committed to the principle “convict if and only if the 
defendant’s guilt is beyond reasonable doubt”, understood as a probability of guilt above 99%. 
Surprisingly, the jurors may then lack an incentive to vote truthfully. Suppose I am one of the 
12 jurors, and suppose, for the sake of argument, the others will vote truthfully. Should I then 
vote truthfully too? Note that my vote will make a difference only if everyone else votes for 
																																																						
19 This is subject to one restriction: in this initial preference profile, at least one individual must hold each logically 
possible preference.  
20 For the purposes of the example, I assume that there is a common prior probability of ½ of guilt, and that, given 
guilt, each juror has a 70% chance of receiving a “guilty” signal, and given innocence, each juror has a 70% 
chance of receiving a “not guilty” signal. 
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“guilty”. If some others vote for “not guilty”, then the outcome will be a “not guilty” verdict, 
no matter how I vote. If everyone else votes for “guilty”, on the other hand, then my vote will 
be pivotal; it will determine whether we reach unanimity. Now, if the others vote truthfully, 
there is only a small chance that they are all wrong: all 11 signals would have to be incorrect, 
a chance of (30%)11: less than two in a million and well below the threshold of reasonable 
doubt. So, whether or not my own signal supports a “guilty” verdict, I should vote for “guilty” 
under the present assumptions. Even if my own signal suggests “not guilty”, it is more likely 
that this signal is wrong than that the others’ signals are all wrong. 
The example shows that even when all jurors have the same goal – namely to convict if and 
only if the defendant’s guilt is beyond reasonable doubt – voting truthfully is not generally a 
dominant strategy. In consequence, unanimous jury decisions may fail to protect the innocent 
from wrongful convictions. Other aggregation rules, such as the majority rule, suffer from 
similar problems (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). Crucially, however, all these problems arise 
under a purely aggregative model of decision making: voters have no opportunity to 
communicate and share their private information before voting. 
What happens if we introduce deliberation? A game-theoretic body of work addresses this 
question (e.g., Coughlan 2000; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2005, 2006; Meirowitz 2006; 
Landa and Meirowitz 2009). Deliberation is modelled thinly as an opportunity for voters to 
share their private information before voting. We can think of this as a straw poll, an informal 
round of voting in which everyone can reveal their signal to the group. We must now 
distinguish between two cases: the case in which there is a consensus on the underlying goal, 
and the case in which there is not (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006). An underlying 
consensus is a situation in which, if all private information were publicly revealed, voters 
would always agree on what the correct choice is. When there is an underlying consensus, any 
disagreements stem from differences in private information. In the jury example, where all 
jurors agree on the threshold of reasonable doubt and on the prior probability of guilt,21 there 
is an underlying consensus in this sense. By contrast, when there is no underlying consensus, 
different voters would support different options even conditional on full disclosure of all 
private information. In that case, different voters are said to have different biases. 
Clearly, if there is an underlying consensus, then deliberation is always helpful (Coughlan 
2000). In the jury example, sharing all private signals among the jurors would mean that 
everyone will come to the same view on whether the defendant should be convicted, and the 
jurors would vote unanimously either for “guilty” or for “not guilty”, depending on the shared 
information. Furthermore, the jurors would have no incentives to misrepresent their private 
signals during deliberation. Given the underlying consensus, it is in everyone’s interest that all 
private information be revealed truthfully. If we think of deliberation as a game, truthful 
information sharing is a dominant strategy here. 
By contrast, if there is no underlying consensus, the situation is more complicated. In the jury 
example, some jurors might be committed to a 1% threshold of reasonable doubt, others to a 
10% threshold, still others to a 25% threshold, and so on. Furthermore, different jurors might 
assign different prior probabilities to the guilt of the defendant. We must then distinguish 
between two sub-cases. If the voters’ biases are common knowledge, then, unfortunately, 
truthful information sharing may no longer be a dominant strategy in deliberation (Coughlan 
																																																						
21 Also, the reliability of the jurors’ signals is common knowledge. 
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2000). Participants may engage in untruthful cheap talk.22 If, instead, voters are uncertain about 
the biases of others, then there may be some scope for deliberation to induce truth-telling, but 
whether it does will depend on the aggregation rule that is used after deliberation (Austen-
Smith and Feddersen 2006). If it is the majority rule, then, under some conditions, it is rational 
for voters to reveal their signals truthfully during deliberation.23 By contrast, under the 
unanimity rule, voters continue to have incentives to be untruthful in deliberation. In fact, the 
unanimity rule seems uniquely bad at incentivizing truth-telling in deliberation.24     
The bottom line is that if we model deliberation as nothing more than an opportunity for voters 
to share private information before voting – a form of “straw polling” – then the participants’ 
incentives for and against truth-telling depend on several factors: first, whether there is a 
consensus on the underlying goal (if so, deliberation induces truth-telling; if not, it doesn’t 
generally do so); second, whether, in the absence of a consensus, there is uncertainty about 
voters’ biases (if so, truth-telling is sometimes rational; if not, it may not be); and third, the 
voting rule (if it is non-unanimitarian, like the majority rule, then deliberation sometimes 
induces truth-telling; if it is the unanimity rule, it may not). One response to these conclusions 
is to argue that if we do not model deliberation as unverifiable cheap-talk but assume that 
deliberators can report verifiable evidence, then the unanimity rule as well as disclosure of 
biases may be conducive to truthful information sharing (Mathis 2011).  
5.4 The mechanisms of deliberation-induced opinion change 
The formal models of deliberation I have reviewed differ significantly in what they assume 
about the individual-level mechanisms of deliberation-induced opinion change. The 
preference-transformation model in Section 5.1 is most abstract, modelling deliberation simply 
as a process in which pre-deliberation preferences are transformed into post-deliberation 
preferences, without specifying any micro-mechanisms. The combined model of deliberation 
and aggregation in Section 5.2 suggests that deliberation can change preferences via changing 
the participants’ beliefs about how good the options are, while presupposing that there is an 
objective betterness ordering. The game-theoretic model in Section 5.3 portrays deliberation 
as a process that can change the participants’ factual-empirical beliefs, by providing them with 
new information, while not changing their underlying goals or preferences. The last model, 
																																																						
22 [Online only] Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) explain the problem as follows. Consider a three-member 
jury. Suppose two jurors have a “high” bias: they would support a “guilty” verdict only if all jurors’ private signals 
support guilt. And suppose the third juror has a “low” bias: he or she would support a “guilty” verdict as soon as 
one of the signals supports guilt. Austen-Smith and Feddersen note that “given a voting rule and given certainty 
regarding the [biases] of others, a juror can identify the information possessed by others under which the revelation 
of his or her own information is pivotal” (p. 210). In the present example, “if the rule requires all jurors to vote 
for conviction, then the only circumstance in which any one juror’s information is relevant is when the two [high-
bias jurors] have both observed the guilty signal. In this case, the low-bias juror always prefers conviction, and so 
does better by misreporting his signal and voting to convict in the (cheap-talk stage) straw poll” (p. 210). 
23 [Online only] As Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006, pp. 210-211), explain: “When information is sufficiently 
good, jurors put more weight on the event that other jurors have observed information similar to their own and 
therefore (if deliberation matters) it is more likely that the other jurors share her [judgment], in which case telling 
the truth is in the individual’s best interest”.  
24 [Online only] As Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006, p. 211) put it, each voter’s ability to veto a positive 
decision (conviction) under the unanimity rule means that “the only pivotal event at the communication stage is 
when all others have information such that, by speaking in favor of conviction, a juror convinces the others to 
vote to convict when at least one of them would not otherwise do so; so either the individual, on the basis of what 
he or she learns from others’ straw votes, wishes to convict and lying turns out to be in his or her interest or, given 
what is learned from others, the individual wishes to acquit and can ensure this simply by voting to acquit whatever 
he or she might have said in debate”.  
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unlike the first two, is based on the classical rational-choice-theoretic picture of agency. I will 
now explain why this picture leaves relatively little room for deliberation-induced opinion 
change, and how we might lift its restrictions. 
According to classical rational choice theory, an agent has preferences over different possible 
outcomes and beliefs over different possible states of the world, and acts so as to satisfy those 
preferences in accordance with those beliefs. Preferences are usually represented by some 
utility function, and beliefs by some subjective probability function. Rational choice then 
consists in choosing an action that maximizes expected utility, where actions are represented 
by functions from states of the world to outcomes (Savage 1954).25 According to this picture, 
an agent’s preferences over fully specified outcomes never change. Only beliefs about the state 
of the world are open to revision, and belief revision only happens when the agent learns new 
information, via Bayesian conditioning.  
In this way, the agent’s “surface-level” preferences over uncertain prospects may change in 
response to new information, while the underlying fundamental preferences remain fixed. I 
may change my surface-level preference between nuclear energy and coal energy when I learn 
how each technology affects the environment, but my fundamental preferences, such as 
between a clean and a polluted environment, remain the same. Classical rational choice theory 
further assumes full rationality: the agent has consistent beliefs and preferences, is aware of all 
their implications, and can calculate the best response in any choice situation. On this picture, 
there is no scope for deliberation-induced opinion change beyond the learning of new 
information.  
By contrast, once we relax rational choice theory’s restrictive assumptions and replace them 
with more realistic ones, we can identify several significant ways in which deliberation might 
change opinions. First, there can be forms of belief change distinct from Bayesian conditioning. 
Under Bayesian conditioning, belief changes are possible only when the agent acquires new 
information. Furthermore, this always takes the form of ruling out certain states of the world, 
namely those excluded by the information. The probabilities over the remaining states of the 
world are then reassigned in proportion to the agent’s prior probabilities. A Bayesian agent 
cannot learn that his or her prior probabilities were incorrect. A more permissive form of 
conditioning is Jeffrey conditioning. Here, the agent can acquire a new probability distribution 
over different states of the world, without ruling out any of them. Jeffrey conditioning permits 
updates of the agent’s prior probabilities, over and above Bayesian information acquisition. If 
deliberators can engage in Jeffrey conditioning, then deliberation might induce changes in their 
subjective prior probabilities and not just provide them with new information in the Bayesian 
sense (e.g., Halpern 2003; Bradley 2009; Dietrich, List, and Bradley 2016).  
Second, an agent’s fundamental preferences might themselves be open to change. In particular, 
the agent’s preferences may depend on how the agent perceives or conceptualizes the options 
(even fully specified outcomes), and a change in perception or conceptualization might lead to 
a preference change (Dietrich and List 2011, 2013a,b). For example, I might initially perceive 
different policies solely in terms of how they affect my budget and well-being, without 
considering their effects on other people, let alone their effects on distant strangers and the 
environment. My focus on a limited set of good-making features of the options need not be due 
to a lack of information. It may be due to a lack of salience of other considerations. If new 
																																																						
25 [Online only] One does not generally know which outcome will result from a given action if one is uncertain 
about the state of the world; the same action may lead to different outcomes in different states. 
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considerations become salient during deliberation – for example, I come to see them as relevant 
reasons for preferring some options over others – this might lead to a preference change. (On 
different forms of preference change, see also Grüne-Yanoff and Hansson 2009 and Bradley 
2009.) 
Third, since real people are not logically omniscient – i.e., they are not aware of all the 
implications of their beliefs – there is further scope for opinion change in deliberation. 
Deliberators may learn that their beliefs have implications they had not previously noticed. 
This may, in turn, induce a “reflective equilibrium” process, in which participants either come 
to endorse these hitherto unrecognized implications, or revise some of their beliefs in order to 
avoid any unwanted implications. Participants may also come to recognize some 
inconsistencies in their opinions and correct them. Similarly, they might notice ambiguities 
that need to be addressed. A hypothetical “homo economicus”, by contrast, would never suffer 
from any limitations of rationality. Such an agent would not be able to “discover” any 
problematic features or unrecognized implications of his or her own prior views. For a model 
of deliberation as “self-discovery” under bounded rationality, see Hafer and Landa (2007). 
In sum, depending on how far we depart from classical rational choice theory, deliberation may 
lead participants to change their opinions in at least four ways: by giving them new information; 
by drawing their attention to unrecognized implications, inconsistencies, or ambiguities within 
their beliefs and preferences; by leading participants to reflect on the considerations or reasons 
that are relevant and/or publicly justifiable; and by putting participants in a social situation in 
which they come to relate to others. These may be described as the “informational”, 
“argumentative”, “reflective”, and “social aspects” of deliberation (Dryzek and List 2003). 
6. Deliberation and the aggregation of judgments 
A final area of social choice theory that is sometimes associated with deliberation is judgment-
aggregation theory (formalized in List and Pettit 2002 and Dietrich 2007; for a survey, see List 
and Puppe 2009). Its focus is not on the aggregation of preference orderings, but on the 
aggregation of judgments, understood as “true/false” or “yes/no” verdicts on some statements 
or propositions, usually with logical connections between them.  
Judgment-aggregation theory was inspired by the study of decision making in collegial courts 
(Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993). For example, a court may need to make judgments on 
propositions such as “the defendant has committed a particular act” (a), “the act was 
contractually prohibited” (b), and “the defendant is liable for a breach of contract” (c), where 
a and b are jointly necessary and sufficient for c. The task is not to arrive at a collective 
preference ordering, but to make collective “yes/no” judgments on the relevant propositions. 
For another common example, consider an expert committee faced with propositions such as 
“atmospheric CO2 exceeds 400ppm” (d), “if CO2 exceeds 400ppm, then the Greenland ice will 
melt” (d®e), and “the Greenland ice will melt” (e). Again, the task is to arrive at collective 
judgments, based on the underlying individual judgments. 
Judgment-aggregation theory offers a formal framework for modelling such aggregation 
problems and for identifying suitable aggregation rules that satisfy certain desiderata. By 
accommodating decisions involving “true/false” or “yes/no” judgments on logically connected 
propositions, it allows us to analyze a different class of decision problems than traditionally 
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modelled in social choice theory.26 At first, it is not obvious why judgment-aggregation theory 
should be any more relevant to deliberation than traditional social choice theory is. However, 
its relevance lies in the fact that it can model decisions whose content goes beyond the ranking 
of options, and the interest in such decisions is shared by theorists of deliberative democracy. 
The content of a judgment-aggregation problem may be an entire web of interconnected 
propositions, akin to what philosophers call a “web of belief” (e.g., Quine and Ullian 1978). A 
court cannot simply hold the defendant liable without accepting the reasons for liability. An 
expert committee, similarly, cannot plausibly declare that the ice will melt if it does not also 
accept the premises to back up this judgment.   
Once we recognize the need to arrive at collective judgments on webs of propositions, we can 
see some further limitations of a crude aggregative approach. Several much-discussed 
examples – the “doctrinal” or “discursive paradoxes” – show that propositionwise majority 
voting is problematic (Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993; Pettit 2001; List and Pettit 2002).27 
Suppose, for instance, the individual judgments in a court or in an expert committee are as 
shown in Tables 1 and 2.  
Table 1: A profile of individual judgments in the court example 
 a b c 
Individual 1 True True True 
Individual 2 True False False 
Individual 3 False True False 
Majority True True False 
Table 2: A profile of individual judgments in the expert-committee example 
 d d®e e 
Individual 1 True True True 
Individual 2 True False False 
Individual 3 False True False 
Majority True True False 
In each case, all individuals’ judgments are internally consistent, and yet the majority 
judgments are inconsistent. If a court were to endorse the majority judgments in Table 1, it 
would hold that the defendant did the relevant act, that the act was prohibited, and yet that the 
defendant is not liable, despite accepting that the first two propositions jointly imply liability. 
Similarly, if the expert committee accepted the majority judgments in Table 2, it would be 
committed to an inconsistent view: CO2 is above the threshold; this will cause the melting of 
the ice; and yet the ice will not melt.  
In an attempt to avoid such inconsistencies, early discussions of judgment aggregation revolved 
around the contrast between “premise-based” and “conclusion-based” procedures (e.g., 
Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993; Chapman 1998; Pettit 2001). Under a premise-based 
procedure, the group takes majority votes only on premises – e.g., a and b or d and d®e – and 
																																																						
26 [Online only] In fact, even preference aggregation problems can be translated into the relevant format, by re-
expressing preference orderings as binary ranking judgments. For instance, a preference for x over y over z can 
be re-expressed as the set of propositions xPy, yPz, and xPz, where “P” stands for “is preferred/preferable to”.  
27 [Online only] The term “doctrinal paradox” refers to the fact that the premise-based and conclusion-based 
procedures (discussed in the main text) may lead to opposite outcomes, while the term “discursive dilemma” (or 
simply: “problem of majoritarian inconsistency”) refers to a broader point: namely that propositionwise majority 
voting on logically connected propositions may lead to inconsistent collective judgments. 
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then derives its judgments on all conclusions – e.g., c or e – by logical inference. In both tables, 
the result would be the collective acceptance of all three propositions, despite the majority 
against the proposition in the last column. Under a conclusion-based procedure, the group takes 
majority votes only on conclusions – e.g., c or e – while not making any judgments on premises. 
In each table, the result would be the collective rejection of the proposition in the final column, 
which shows that the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures may lead to opposite 
outcomes, even when the individual judgments are the same.  
It has been argued that the premise-based procedure is more consistent with deliberative 
democracy’s emphasis on reason-giving, while the conclusion-based procedure embodies a 
more minimalist conception of democracy (Pettit 2001; List 2006). Technically, both 
procedures are still aggregation rules and need not involve any pre-vote deliberation. Yet, the 
premise-based procedure captures the idea that the group as a collective draws some reasoned 
inferences from the propositions it accepts by voting, an idea that Pettit (2001) has described 
as the “collectivization of reason”. The conclusion-based procedure, by contrast, captures the 
idea of a minimalist collective outcome, namely what Sunstein (1994) calls an “incompletely 
theorized agreement”. Sometimes it may be controversial which propositions are “premises” 
and which are “conclusions”. Different orders of priority or premisehood among the 
propositions may, in turn, give rise to different collective judgments, thereby generating the 
problem of path dependence and agenda manipulability (List 2004; Dietrich 2016).   
Technical work (reviewed in List and Puppe 2009) has focused on characterizing the conditions 
under which consistent judgment aggregation is or is not possible, studying the properties of 
practicable aggregation rules, and identifying conditions that will or will not induce truth-
telling. Here, it has been suggested that deliberatively motivated agents are less prone to 
strategic voting than purely outcome-oriented agents (Dietrich and List 2007). 
As a heuristic tool, judgment-aggregation theory, like social choice theory more generally, can 
sharpen our understanding of the tradeoffs between different desiderata of democracy, such as 
robustness to pluralism, responsiveness to the majority opinion, and collective rationality. One 
of social choice theory’s lessons is that we can achieve any two of these desiderata, but not all 
three (List 2011a). The challenge, in the debate about deliberation and social choice, is to 
decide which of those desiderata to keep and which to relax.  
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